Abstract-Security against hardware Trojan that is capable to change the computational output value is accomplished by employing dual modular redundant (DMR) schedule during high level synthesis (HLS). However, building a DMR for Trojan security is nontrivial and incurs extra delay and hardware. This paper proposes a novel HLS methodology for constraint driven low cost hardware Trojan secured DMR schedule design for loop-based control data flow graphs (CDFGs). Proposed approach simultaneously explores an optimal schedule and optimal loop unrolling factor (U) combination for a low cost Trojan security aware DMR schedule. As a specific example, proposed low cost Trojan secured HLS approach relies on particle swarm optimization algorithm to explore optimized Trojan secured schedule with optimal unrolling that provides security against specific Trojan (causing change in computational output) within user provided area and delay constraints. The novel contributions of this paper are, first an exploration of a low cost Trojan security aware HLS solution for loop-based CDFGs; second, proposed encoding scheme for representing design solution comprising candidate schedule resources, candidate loop unrolling factor and candidate vendor allocation information; third, a process for exploring the a low cost vendor assignment that provides Trojan security; finally, experimental results over the standard benchmark that indicates an average reduction in final cost of ∼12% compared to recent approach.
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I. INTRODUCTION
H ARDWARE Trojan's are malicious logic/hardware components embedded by a rogue in order to induce malfunctioning of integrated circuits (ICs). Globalization of system on chips (SoCs) design and manufacturing has raised serious concerns on the security and trustworthiness of the embedded third party intellectual property (3PIP) [1] - [4] . Fig. 1 shows the typical design cycle involving third party vendors and in house system design. In this figure, the first block indicating datapath components or third party register transfer level (RTL) library is considered untrustworthy, while the remaining blocks (in house system designer and foundry) are considered trustworthy. The SoCs may involve analog and digital components at the same time for cost and performance tradeoffs [5] . However, the focus of this current paper is the digital components when their design exploration are performed at the architecture level.
During designing, an IP may be corrupted (by an adversary), by inserting hardware Trojan into it. During high level synthesis (HLS), it should be ensured that any possible infection of 3PIP is detectable, thereby generating a trustworthy design. 3PIPs are the IPs present in the module library of an HLS tool, which may have been imported from an outside (third party) vendor and is considered untrustworthy. The key is that any third party module may contain malicious Trojan logic inserted by an adversary in the third party design house. This unique possibility of Trojan insertion in third party module of an HLS library was highlighted and discussed in [6] . In a typical case, the HLS company provides the RTL files of the modules/IPs of the library, which might have been imported from third party vendors. These RTL files of a module may contain Trojan logic as discussed above. Therefore, detection strategy during HLS for possible Trojan in 3PIP/module (present in the library) requires attention [6] . However, the detection process of hardware Trojan during HLS mandates additional hardware, which upon deployment may not abide by the user area constraint provided. Further, incorporating additional logic for Trojan detection during HLS also results in extra delay for processing output, which again may not abide by the user delay constraints specified. It therefore becomes mandatory to consider the effect of extra delay and hardware cost during design space exploration (DSE) in HLS.
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The aforesaid process is applicable for data flow graphs (DFGs) in HLS. However, in the context of loopbased control DFGs (CDFGs), the exploration of a low cost hardware Trojan security aware schedule does not suffice alone, due to involvement of an additional variable called "loop unrolling factor." Loop unrolling plays an important significance in dictating the final area and delay of a design. Therefore, during the design of a Trojan security aware schedule for CDFGs, simultaneously considering the effects of loop unrolling on its area-delay tradeoff is equally critical. This paper resolves the aforesaid problem by proposing a methodology for simultaneous DSE of low cost Trojan security aware dual modular redundant (DMR) schedule and optimal loop unrolling factor, that satisfies the user area-delay constraints provided. DMR results in duplication of operations, which in turn may lead to more steering logic and internal buffering compared to a normal (non-DMR) design. However, proposed low cost Trojan secured DMR scheduling does not lead to functional resource overhead as it is designed based on resource constraints, which is iteratively obtained through particle swarm optimization (PSO) process. Further, the hardware overhead of proposed Trojan secured DMR (i.e., steering logic and internal buffers) is also optimized in our approach.
The rest of this paper is organized in the following manner. Section II discusses the novelty aspects of this paper. Section III describes a scenario of hardware Trojan in 3PIP. Further, Section IV discusses the approaches developed so far, to handle hardware Trojans. Sections V and VI present the evaluation models and proposed methodology. The results are further described in Section VII.
II. NOVEL CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS PAPER
The novel contributions of this paper for advancement of state-of-art in HLS for trusted hardware are as follows.
1) Approach for simultaneous exploration of low cost Trojan security aware DMR schedule and optimal loop unrolling factor during HLS that abides by the user areadelay constraints provided. This paper aims at providing low cost Trojan detection and not recovery (unlike in [7] and [8] ). Therefore, the proposed technique in this paper is not extended for triple modular redundant designs to keep a focused scope. 2) Vendor allocation exploration procedure during proposed PSO driven DSE process. This encoding explores the most efficient vendor assignment that provides Trojan detection. 3) Encoding scheme for representing design solutions that comprises of candidate schedule resources, candidate loop unrolling factor and candidate vendor allocation information. 4) Technique for area-delay tradeoff using PSO during exploration of a low cost Trojan security aware DMR schedule. DMR may lead to more steering logic and internal buffering compared to a normal (non-DMR) design. However, proposed low cost Trojan secured DMR scheduling does not lead to functional resource overhead (unlike in [6] ) as it is designed based on resource constraints (fed through PSO process). Further, the overhead of proposed secured DMR (i.e., steering logic and internal buffers) is also optimized in our approach. 5) Model for delay estimation of a Trojan secured DMR CDFG. 
A. Why Security Aware HLS?
Digital ICs go through design exploration at various stages of abstraction in consistence with divide and conquer philosophy, to handle the complexity at the same time to control the nonrecurrent design cost. There is no doubt that, HLS is way matured starting from performance optimization, power optimization, to process variation optimization, conducted at the architecture level [9] , [10] . In the current era of smart mobile computing, IP-based designs are the need of the hour to meet the time to market demand and HLS techniques can play more crucial role for the design engineers [5] . So, a natural progression of HLS research is to explore security awareness along the other challenges at the architecture level through HLS. The key idea of low cost Trojan security aware HLS solution for loop-based CDFGs has been depicted in Fig. 2 .
B. Threat Model for Proposed Research
This paper targets Trojans in 3PIPs that only change computational output value (and produces no other impact). This paper does not target class of Trojans that steal information/data. The insertion of Trojan is possible in the following way. A malicious IP/module present in the library of an HLS tool is designed either by a rogue in the 3PIP design house or by a rogue in the in-house design team. Since the adversary may not provide Trojan-related information, hence detection by the validation team is difficult. In proposed approach the foundry and the in-house system designer are considered to be trustworthy in the IC design flow. In other words, in our proposed approach only the third party vendor (design house) is considered untrustworthy. This indicates an adversary or rogue designer only in the third party house can manipulate the IP [as the entire IPs (examples shown in Fig. 3 until triggered by a rogue and therefore is difficult to be detected during security review by in-house design team. This is due to reason that, during normal conditions (when not triggered), the logic behaves like a functionally correct IP. Typically, the HLS company provides the RTL files of the modules/IPs of the library that may contain malicious/Trojan logic, which might have been imported from third party vendors. The proposed approach deals with hardware Trojan in the modules/IP that changes its computational value. However, the key is that Trojan only becomes visible at runtime (after triggering by an adversary), thereby remaining completely ineffective before, thus being difficult to detect during RTL simulation/other lower level tests. Additionally, for the case when the Trojan is "always on" in an IP, it is likely that most of the outputs reflect no change during RTL simulation (except a few). Therefore, without detailed examination, the Trojan may sometimes go unnoticed. This is applicable for both small and large size modules present in HLS library. This is because, even small modules are activated by an adversary when deployed in real time situation to perform computational error. Even an exhaustive examination (through RTL simulation, physical inspection, etc.) for small modules makes it difficult for detection as in offline situation it behaves like a functionally correct IP. The next paragraph outlines in details the reasons why this type of Trojan in IP is difficult to detect through normal examination. Fig. 3 shows an instance of Trojan within a 3PIP/module present inside the library of an HLS tool.
Here, few examples of possible Trojan logic in components (BCD adder, decoder, digital comparator, multiplier, etc.) of an HLS tool library are shown, which on triggering changes the normal functional output. The triggering of the Trojan can be achieved through numerous possibilities such as, activation through Trojan time bomb (FSM counter), sensing a specific design signal, external antenna, etc. Regardless of where the component is used, activation of the Trojan logic is bound to impact the computational output value of the entire system. This is because, the Trojan that we handle in this paper only intends to affect the computational output value of the system (that is, change the digital value), and not steal/leak any secret information. Therefore, knowledge of the architecture of the system is not required by the attacker to exploit hardware Trojan and affect computational output value. Such Trojans are difficult to be detected with the detection techniques applied at lower levels of abstraction such as side channel analysis [11] and RTL simulation as described below. This is because, first, Trojan logics by design are typically triggered under very specific predefined conditions (such as through FSM counter value, sensing a specific design signal, external antenna, etc.) which makes them unlikely to be activated and detected during normal functional verification by test vectors [12] . Normally, in the system RTL code, only the complete design is functionally verified; second, in spite of functional verification check (RTL simulation), the IP will perform normally/correctly due to being dormant at that stage. It is only activated by an adversary when deployed in real time situation to perform functional failure. Third, because there is no trustworthy golden IP model, therefore, the detection of Trojan in a 3PIP during HLS is not possible. Moreover, detection by physical inspection and reverse engineering are very difficult and costly owing to the complexity involved and nanometer IC feature size. Since Trojans are intelligently inserted in a particular portion of the design and may be activated by a single triggering signal, therefore, reverse engineering usually does not guarantee detection of Trojan. This is because, detection of Trojans during reverse engineering depends on its accuracy and efficiency, thus making the detection difficult. Additionally, tests used for detecting manufacturing faults (such as, stuck at faults, delay faults, and bridging faults) cannot guarantee detection of such Trojans. Finally, detection of such Trojan using analysis of parametric signals is considered ineffective [12] due to decrease in physical feature size because of evolution in technology.
Direct conversion into an RTL structure from its corresponding behavioral description (CDFG) is accomplished through HLS which involves the process of DSE that includes evaluation of alternative candidate design solutions based on objectives such as area and delay [13] - [23] . During this process, multiple subprocesses participate such as scheduling, allocation and binding [16] . The process of DSE gets convoluted with the involvement of auxiliary variable called loop unrolling factor for CDFG applications as it adds an extra dimension to explore based on conflicting user constraints of area and delay. Moreover, the consideration of the aforesaid variables during DSE of a trusted hardware is extremely complex as discussed in Section I.
IV. RELATED PRIOR RESEARCH
No effort has been made on designing a low cost Trojan security aware HLS that considers optimization of schedule and loop unrolling (based on user constraints). There have been few promising work that is based on code-coverage analysis, property checker which checks whether an IP satisfies those properties. In code-coverage analysis [24] , list of suspicious signals are identified in the RTL design. Those signals are identified as suspicious signals which remain stable during coverage analysis. The motivation behind this concept is that Trojans normally do not change states until triggered. Then the approach adds test vectors to activate uncovered parts of the design. Though this is beneficial, however, it results in huge verification time. Additionally, redundant circuit removal is applied since these tend to stay at the same logic level during verification. This is obtained by techniques where scan chains are inserted into the post synthesis results (gate level netlist) and analyzed for stuck-at-faults through test patterns generated by automatic test pattern generation (ATPG) process. An untestable stuck-at-fault is likely to be a redundant logic. Thus, when an ATPG identifies a stuck-at-1/0 fault as untestable, the faulty net can be replaced by logic 1/0 in the gate level netlist. All circuits driving fault nets will be removed as well. Equivalence analysis [25] (like done in case of faults) may be applied on the suspicious signal list in order to reduce the number of signals, however, it incurs runtime overhead. Further, in the lists of suspicious signals not all signals are Trojans. Moreover, in this approach the quantity of suspicious signals keeps increasing with the increase in the complexity of Trojan inserted. Finally, it is difficult to achieve 100% code-coverage for all IPs.
Salmani et al. [26] developed an efficient dummy flipflop insertion procedure to increase the transition probability of nets when it is lower than a specific probability threshold. The transition probability was modeled using geometric distribution. Furthermore, a number of approaches have been proposed for Trojan detection at lower levels of chip design [12] , [27] - [30] . Besides [20] , which has dealt with Trojan detection at system level, however, with no effort on exploring an optimized Trojan secured schedule with optimal loop unrolling (based on user constraints) that is capable of providing system level protection. Wang et al. [30] detected Trojans by generating a multiple supply transient current integration methodology. Once the detection of Trojan in a chip is done, an isolation process is initiated to isolate the Trojans within the IC. In [27] , the detection process uses chip characteristics like path delay and power consumption (of the manufactured chips) and compares them with the expected values to identify Trojans. Moreover, the approach in [28] is capable of detecting malicious hardware modifications in the presence of large process variation induced noise. The detection strategy relies on the fact that, Trojan's once inserted change the design parameters of the circuit.
Rajendran et al. [6] and Cui et al. [7] have dealt with Trojan detection at system level. Rajendran et al. [6] and Cui et al. [7] adopted a concurrent error detection approach for Trojan detection. The approaches use a diverse set of 3PIP vendors for Trojan identification. Authors have only targeted DFGs and therefore do not handle loop-based CDFG. Moreover, the approaches [6] , [7] do not have techniques for exploration of efficient vendor allocation procedure for hardware in DMR system since it affects the final area-delay of the solution [31] . As a result of which an inferior quality solution (higher cost) is generated. However, the proposed approach only focuses on Trojan detection and not on preventing its activation (see [6] ). Therefore, the cost comparisons reported for both approaches are with respect to Trojan detection only. The proposed Trojan secured HLS is different than fault secured HLS approach [32] in terms of the threat model, number of vendors required and the type of security constraints imposed. For example, the threat model considered in Trojan secured HLS is malicious logic inserted by an adversary secretly which remains dormant until triggered. However, fault secured HLS considers resiliency against transient faults. Further, Trojan secured HLS requires at least two vendors to provide distinctness in the DMR output, however, its counterpart only requires one vendor for security. Finally, the Trojan secured HLS demands distinct vendor allocation to hardwares of sister operations in DMR while its counterpart requires distinct hardware assignments to sister operations in DMR only (where even both distinct hardware units may be from same vendor).
V. SECURITY AWARE HLS: FORMULATION
AND MODELS The aim of proposed approach is to explore the design space of a Trojan secured DMR schedule comprising of candidate solutions for DMR schedule resource configurations (architecture), candidate loop unrolling factor and candidate vendor assignment procedure, all hybrid encoded (as discussed in the upcoming sections).
A. Problem Definition
Determine a solution for Trojan secured DMR schedule, optimal Table I . "P v " is the vendor allocation procedure capable of holding only binary value (where P v = "1" indicates all operations of a specific unit being strictly assigned to resources of same vendor type, e.g., all operations of original unit strictly assigned to same vendor "V 1 " and all operations of duplication to same vendor "V 2 "; while P v = "0" indicates alternate vendor assignment to operations in a CS of a unit). Hence, the variable P v is crucial for Trojan secured schedule optimization, as both P v = 0 and P v = 1, provide vendor distinctness in DMR design resulting in Trojan security. However, they have different impact on final delay of the design.
B. Proposed Evaluation Models
In the proposed work, each particle position represents a hybrid encoding of candidate solutions for schedule resource configurations (X i ), loop unrolling factor (U), and vendor assignment procedure information (P v ) in the design space.
1) Proposed Area Model: Total area consumed (A DMR

T
) by a resource set is given by
where, the variables are explained in Table I .
Note: The area component includes area due to functional resources, interconnect units (mux and demux), comparator (for error detection) as well as overhead incurred from internal buffering (during temporary storage of operation output in DMR scheduling). The area evaluated is with respect to module library generated with CMOS 90 nm technology node [33] , [34] .
2) Proposed Delay Model: The delay is evaluated after derivation of the delay model using the following two cases.
Case 1: When "U" is equal to one (indicates no unrolling) then: total # of CS = # of CS required executing loop body once * number of duplicate iterations of loop body
where Table I . Note: Equation (2) is valid when U evenly divides the loop count(I) (i.e., I % U == 0).
Case 2: When U unevenly divides I: in such a case, ImodU iterations will be executed sequentially, therefore, the total no. of CSs is
{CSs for unrolled loop} {CSs for sequential loop}.
The variables are explained in Table I . Hence, the execution time for the system is calculated as
where, " " is the delay of one CS in nanoseconds. The delay model is based on the latency values of each functional hardware described at 90 nm technology scale [35] .
3) Fitness Function: The fitness function (considering execution time and area consumption of a solution) is inspired from [36] and [37] is formulated as
The variables are explained in Table I . W 1 and W 2 are the user defined weights both kept at 0.5 during exploration to provide equal preference. The equation above is a penalty graded cost function which incorporates the effect of user constraints (A cons and T cons ) during fitness evaluation of DMR system. Further, it considers the maximum values of area and execution time (delay) during evaluation to yield a normalized value of cost (between 0 and 1). Since the objective of the proposed exploration approach is to satisfy the user constraints as well as minimize the hybrid cost (specified in Section V-A), hence a higher negative value indicates a more desirable solution.
VI. PROPOSED SECURITY AWARE DSE IN HLS For detection of hardware Trojan in 3PIPs that only change computational output value (and produces no other impact), minimum two distinct third party vendors are required. The concept of this was introduced in [6] . Even if the IPs from two different vendors have dissimilar timing, but functional similarity of two distinct IPs, allow for comparison at the DMR output. In the proposed approach, we only require two distinct vendors for generating a Trojan secured schedule. We do not require optimization of number of vendors, however, we optimize the cost of solution by regulating internal allocation process of two distinct vendor within DMR schedule through a variable P v during exploration. Imposing diverse set of 3PIP vendors as security constraints during allocation step for similar operations in DMR design during HLS provides detection of malicious output. A simple demonstrative example is shown in Fig. 5 , where y is the primary input. Let us consider a scenario: multiplier of vendor V1 is malicious: in such case assuming the multiplier maliciously performs division. The subsequent output from original unit is 1/y, however, the duplicate output is y 3 , indicating Trojan detection (due to difference in computation value). As discussed in [6] for cases where no sub-IP exists, it is highly unlikely that different Trojans in different 3PIPs will produce identical wrong outputs. In other words, when no sub-IP exists, the chance of IP from both third party vendors being Trojan infected or carrying same Trojan logic is low. In this approach, we do not provide solution for cases when a 3PIP instantiates a Trojan infected sub-IP from another IP vendor, as it falls beyond the target scope of this paper. If both vendors are untrusted, the chance of their hidden Trojan logic being same is very rare (as both third party vendors are mutually exclusive of each other). Just performing equivalence check on each IP from the different vendors does not help in Trojan detection, since the Trojan in an IP remains dormant (inactive) in normal condition and gets activated only on external triggering (by an adversary) during real time deployment. Therefore, performing equivalence check on both the IP will not reflect a difference (or Trojan detection).
A. Background on PSO Algorithm
PSO is a metaheuristic search methodology where the particles move through a multidimensional search space. Each particle is attracted toward the position of the current global best x gb and its own best location x lb in history. When a particle finds a location that is better than any previously found locations, then it updates it as the new current best for the particle. The position of ith particle is changed by adding the velocity to the current position as follows:
where, x i and v i be the position and velocity vector for particle i. While, the velocity is updated with the following rule:
where, ω is called the inertia weight, b 1 is the cognitive learning factor, b 2 is the social learning factor, r 1 , r 2 are random numbers in the range [0, 1]. 
B. Proposed Methodology for PSO Driven Exploration of Trojan Secured DMR Datapath
Module library, behavioral description of CDFG and predefined user parametric constraints for area and delay, control parameters of PSO (such as inertia weight, acceleration coefficients, and swarm size "p"), maximum iteration count for the CDFG and the preprocessing algorithm for unrolling factors are provided as inputs to the proposed DSE process (as indicated in Fig. 4) . The details of the major steps of PSO driven DSE framework are described in Sections VI-E-VI-H later. However, for the sake of immediate reference, a brief explanation for Fig. 4 is provided below. The PSO-DSE initiates with novel particle encoding process representing a candidate design solution X i in the design space. The encoding scheme for a candidate design solution comprises of DMR schedule architecture ( − → R n ), unrolling factor (U) and distinct vendor allocation procedure type (P v ). Therefore, a particle position which is a candidate design solution in PSO-DSE framework is labeled as X i
where, − → R n indicates the resource array (resource configuration, e.g., number of adders, multipliers, etc.). The reason behind addition of last dimension (vendor allocation procedure type) P v is discussed in the upcoming section. Once the initial encoding phase (initialization of particles) is complete, then the next step is to build a Trojan secured DMR design (discussed in the upcoming section) which is subjected to fitness evaluation through the cost computation block. Determination of local and global best particle position is done after this, followed with calculation of particle velocity and new particle position (X + i ). Determination of new particle position is accomplished by evaluating new value for every dimension (d) for position X + i until, the final dimension "D" is checked [Note: in this paper, the final dimension D is equal to U as indicated in (9) . This is because the last dimension P v can only hold Boolean value as discussed in the upcoming paragraph]. Interaction with velocity and resource clamping block is performed if required to avoid boundary outreach. Then similarly as discussed before, the next step is to build a Trojan secured DMR design for the new particle position X + i followed by evaluation of its cost computation. If the cost of the new particle position (X + i ) is found higher than the previous position (X i ), then change in X + i is made by evaluating another new particle position. Else, the local best particle position is updated. This process is repeated for the entire swarm population size (p) and finally the global best position is updated. Mutation process is followed after this to arrive at a further better solution if possible. The aforesaid process continues until the terminating criteria (Z) is reached.
Mutation: Mutation operation is performed on all local best resource configurations with probability P m = 0.25. The algorithm uses two basic operations for mutation: 1) rotation operation and 2) increment or decrement operation. To perform these, the total population is divided into two groups: 1) even group, in which algorithm performs left rotation operation and 2) odd group, in which algorithm performs increment or decrement with a random number.
C. Preprocessing of Unrolling Factor Candidates
Preprocessing (screening) of unrolling factor candidates that do not form part of an optimal solution during exploration is extremely crucial. Some unrolling factors such as the ones which yield large trailer loops are potential sources for greater delay due to multiple sequential loops involved. Further, it is established in [10] and [36] , that performance is not a monotonically increasing function of unrolling factor value, i.e., for large unrolling factor values; therefore, the performance improvement is found marginal. The corresponding algorithm is shown in Fig. 6 .
D. Designing Trojan Secured DMR Schedule for Design Solution During DSE
In the proposed approach for building Trojan secured schedule, DMR logic with specific vendor allocation rule (discussed in the upcoming paragraph) is employed. In order to obtain a Trojan secured DMR schedule, its corresponding DMR schedule first needs to be obtained. In proposed DMR logic, complete duplication is done for all the unrolled operations of the CDFG [based on the unrolling information (U) of the candidate design solution X i , described in (9)]. This indicates that double modular redundancy of the CDFG is done at the behavioral level itself before scheduling. Once operations of the CDFG are unrolled, then both the operations of original unit and duplicate unit are concurrently scheduled using list scheduling algorithm based on the information of the schedule architecture [N(R 1 ), N(R 2 ), . . . , N(R D ) ] in the candidate design solution (X i ). This enables to extract information of C DMR first and C DMR body to determine the final delay C DMR T (as discussed in Section V-B).
In the proposed approach, as described above DMR logic is employed with some specific vendor allocation rule to design a Trojan secured schedule. The vendor allocation rule states that two distinct vendors are required for operation assignment in DMR such that the similar operations v of original unit (W OG ) and v of duplicate unit (W DP ) are assigned to distinct vendor [6] . This enables Trojan security (detection) as for cases where no sub-IP exists, it is highly unlikely that different Trojans in different 3PIP's will produce identical wrong outputs. In this approach, we do not provide solution for cases when a 3PIP instantiates a Trojan infected Sub-IP from another IP vendor, as it falls beyond the target scope of this paper. However, it is important to note that distinct vendor assignment rule for Trojan security can be implemented in more than one ways (discussed later), therefore, the most optimal distinct vendor allocation to similar operations (in original and duplicate) is explored through our proposed scheme. Therefore, how the two distinct vendors are allocated within the DMR schedule (i.e., assignment of each vendor IPs within the system while allocation) controls the final delay and area of the design. This is because the same resource type/IP from two different vendors have different area and delay.
Note: Further it is assumed that the IP characteristics from vendors (V 1 and V 2 ) are as follows. Multiplier and adder provided by vendor V 1 has area = "2468 au" (au = area unit; 1 au = 1 Transistor) and "2034 au," delay = "10 000 ns" and "265 ns," while multiplier and adder provided by vendor V 2 has area = "2464 au" and "2032 au," delay = "11 000 ns" and "270 ns," respectively. Therefore, in the proposed approach components (IPs) with parametric values (i.e., different cost values) are considered during exploration of an optimized Trojan secured schedule. Since the components serve as modules in the HLS library, the final solution of the proposed approach changes if the components from two different vendors have different parameter values.
Let us now discuss the two different ways (denoted by P v = 1 and P v = 0) how two distinct vendor allocation can be made inside a DMR scheduling in order to provide Trojan security. The value of P v as 0/1 is characterized as follows. It can be seen that there is a difference in the area and delay values of the two generated scheduling solutions, which have distinct vendor assignment to similar operations for detectability. The DMR schedules with vendor allocation details generated in Figs. 7 and 8 are both hardware Trojan secured (with two vendors required in both cases) with duplication of all the operations of the original unrolled CDFG. For the sake of demonstration let us assume we have a candidate design solution X i = (2(+), 4(*), 2(−), 2(<), U = 3), P v for building a Trojan secured DMR schedule. This indicates that the CDFG needs to be unrolled thrice (I 1 , I 2 , and I 3 ) and duplication must be done for all the operations of the three iterations ('I 1 , 'I 2 , and 'I 3 ) to create an unrolled DMR CDFG. Once unrolled DMR CDFG is created, it (both original unit and duplicate unit) will be concurrently scheduled based on the schedule resource information in X i : two adders, four multipliers, two subtractors, and two comparators. However, as evident in Figs. 7 and 8 , one Trojan secured DMR schedule is better than its counterpart in delay or area based on the value of P v , regardless of same schedule resources and unrolling information. Therefore, in context of DSE exploration of P v (indicating allocation procedure of IPs from different vendor type) which can either be 0 or 1 dimension, along with resource array [as shown in (9)] is important.
The cost of obtained Trojan secured DMR schedule is further evaluated. The cost function includes area component due to functional resources, interconnect units (mux and demux), comparator as well as overhead incurred from internal buffering (temporary storage of operation output). The area due to internal buffering involves overhead incurred in a DMR similar operation (from both original duplicate) at different times. The system needs to keep the outputs from both units stored in some internal buffer to compare only when both outputs are ready. This process of evaluating design solutions (particle positions) evolves through the proposed DSE using PSO to generate an optimal hardware Trojan fault secured DMR system that satisfies A cons , T cons , as well as minimizes hybrid cost.
From the above discussion, it is clear that the proposed approach considers three factors.
1) Efficient distinct vendor allocation inside DMR scheduling. 2) Optimized combination of schedule resources. 3) Screening of unwanted loop unrolling factors to achieve low cost optimal solution to Trojan secured schedule. All the aforesaid factors were not considered in past approaches so far.
E. Initialization of Particle
In this current proposed approach, a candidate design solution is represented through a particle. The position of a particle in PSO as defined earlier in (9) can be expanded as follows. The particle position "X i " is given as follows:
The particles are uniformly distributed over the design space and are initialized as follows:
However, rest of the particles (X 4 · · · X n ) are initialized by the following:
where, α is a random integer between min and max of particular resource type or unrolling factor.
F. Particle Movement Using Velocity
PSO-DSE [38] , each dimension (d) of a particle position X i (except the last dimension) is updated using the following function [36] :
The variable V
is updated by (16) as follows:
The local best (X lb i ) and global best (X gb ) particle positions are updated using
The variables have been explained in Table I . A DMR schedule scheduled data flow graph (SDFG DMR ) (with distinct vendor assignment rule to detect the hardware Trojan), is generated corresponding to a particle positions/configurations.
G. Velocity Clamping
The velocity clamping adopted from [36] is performed, when a particle's exploration drift (V
as follows:
In the above expression, the value of ±V max d i is the following:
H. Terminating Condition
The proposed methodology terminates when: 1) the maximum number of iterations exceeds 100 (S 1 ) or 2) when no improvement is visible in X gb over "δ" number of iterations. (δ = 10) (S 2 ).
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section shows the results of proposed methodology discussed in the following sections: 1) experimental setup and benchmark; 2) analysis of results; 3) comparison with related prior research; and 4) detection ability of design solutions generated during DSE.
A. Experimental Setup and Benchmarks
The proposed approach and [6] , have been implemented in java. The proposed flow when implemented run on Intel Core-i5-3210M CPU with 3 MB L3 cache memory, 4 GB DDR3 primary memory and processor frequency of 2.5 GHz. During experimentation, 15 runs were executed for proposed PSO-DSE with equal weightage to both user objectives of area and delay (W 1 = W 2 = 0.5). During experiments, it was found that the proposed approach is scalable and is able to handle large size problems (for instance, mutiple CDFG applications with nodes greater than 200 have been tested, which also yielded final optimal solution within acceptable exploration runtime). Further, during experiments, following optimal settings from [39] for PSO framework were fixed: ω (inertia weight) = linearly decreasing between 0.9 and 0.1; b 1 and b 2 (acceleration coefficient) = 2; r 1 and r 2 (random numbers) = 1; stopping criterion = S 1 or S 2 ; p = 3 or 5 or 7. Table II shows the effect of swarm size p on the exploration time of the proposed methodology. As seen from Table II (for all benchmarks), the exploration time of the proposed approach to find the non dominated solutions increases with the increase in swarm size, however, with no improvement in the quality of the solution found. This is due to the fact that, total number of positions evaluated in a run increases with the increase in p. Additionally, for all the benchmarks, viz. DFGs, single and nested loop applications tested, the proposed approach generates, solutions that lie within the user provided are-delay constraints and minimizes the hybrid cost in (6), as shown in Table III [Note: A cons and T cons could be any value between the minimum (A min , T min ) and maximum value (A max , T max )]. Similar behavior is observed for the other benchmarks. Additionally, the result for approach [6] is shown in Table IV , which shows that the execution time (T DMR E ) for [6] is higher than proposed T DMR E . Further, the process of screening the unfit unrolling factor values through algorithm in Fig. 6 is described in Tables V-VII (for sake of 
B. Analysis of Results
C. Comparison With Related Prior Research
This section reports the comparative results with a state-ofthe-art approach [6] with respect to the final solution.
The cost function, for both [6] and proposed approach, also considers the area of single comparator/error detection block responsible to runtime Trojan detection at the final output. Table VIII shows the comparative results of the proposed approach with [6] , in terms of cost, hardware area, delay, respective overheads, and final architectural solution found. Since both [6] and proposed approach uses the concept of diverse 3PIP vendors, hence both approaches provide equally robust security. As evident, the proposed approach generates lower cost solutions with no area and delay overheads (in most cases) in comparison to [6] . This is because of the following.
1) The proposed approach comprises of a supplementary option in encoding for exploration of an optimal allocation procedure of vendors P v , which bears an impact on the final optimization quality.
2) The proposed approach comprises of another supplementary option in encoding for exploration of an optimal unrolling factor. 3) The proposed approach provides exploration of schedule resources based on user constraints, which also bears an effect on the final design quality. Therefore, calculations show that, the proposed approach provides an average reduction of 11.4% in cost of the final Trojan secured schedule compared to [6] . Since there is no feature for exploring an optimal unrolling factor and distinct vendor allocation in [6] , it uses the maximum unroll factor value as well as same vendor allocation to each unit rule (P v = 1) during DMR design thereby resulting in higher cost. Therefore, distinct vendor allocation type, P v = 0, always yields lower cost final solution than P v = 1. We insert Trojans in components of HLS library that can only change the output computational value (and has no other effect). Therefore, this paper targets only this specific class of Trojan during detection analysis. Few examples of this specific class of Trojan inserted in our approach and its payload are shown in Fig. 3 .
The proposed DSE framework generates solution for Trojan secured DMR schedule. A DMR schedule is generated for every explored solution (before fitness evaluation) which needs validation in its ability to detect hardware Trojan present in the 3PIP. In case of HLS, the 3PIPs are the IPs/modules present in the HLS module library, which may have been imported from an outside (third party) vendor and may contain malicious logic inserted by an adversary in the third party design house. Typically, the HLS company provides the RTL files of the modules/IPs of the library that may contain malicious/Trojan logic, which might have been imported from third party vendors. The proposed approach deals with hardware Trojan in the modules/IP that changes its computational value. However, the key is that Trojan only becomes visible at runtime (after triggering by an adversary), thereby remaining completely ineffective before that, thus difficult to be detected during RTL simulation/other lower level tests. For checking the detection ability of the solution generated, the presence of hardware Trojan in module of HLS library was emulated by inserting malicious logic in the module (such as adder/ subtractor, etc.) of the HLS library. Hardware Trojan were implemented in the modules of the HLS library as maliciously altered RTL codes. Some examples of the schematic equivalent of the malicious alterations made in the RTL codes of the HLS module library are shown in Fig. 3 . Test vectors generated through eighth order polynomial linear-feedback shift register as ATPG is fed into the DMR schedule for comprehensive coverage of Trojan detection in the final explored solution. Results indicate that in the explored solution whenever a Trojan was inserted (in any module provided by a vendor); difference in the computational value in the output was noticed from original and duplicate unit, indicating Trojan detection. One hundred percentage Trojan detection has been possible when handling such Trojans, because these Trojans when activated produce no other effect, but only change in computational value as payload. Hence, through the proposed DMR allocation rules for both P v = 0 and P v = 1, a complete coverage of Trojan detection was obtained. Therefore, it can be said that, it is safe to allow interleaving of IPs (P v = 0) resulting from different vendors. The time taken for the final Trojan secured schedule depends on the initial population selected during exploration. For example, time taken for Trojan security is ∼5.9 s, ∼10.3 s and ∼16.0 s for p = 3, 5, and 7, respectively. For successful detection at least one comparison point is needed, which is at the primary output of DMR scheduling. However, additional checkpoints can be inserted at the output of each unrolled loop body in DMR scheduling. This indicates that the additional checkpoints are equal to the unrolling factor value. In the proposed approach, security can be provided against any Trojan that has ability to affect functional output. This is because insertion of Trojan in a 3PIP by a rogue induces a different output in one of the units than the other due to usage of a distinct vendor in original and duplicate units. This results in comprehensive detection in all cases. However, Trojan which affects output in terms of only disabling components (with no change in output magnitude) cannot be detected in our approach.
a) Security analysis: We further provide security analysis by presenting how robust our approach is. This is a direct indicative of the number of vulnerabilities detected by proposed approach. Each potentially untrustworthy 3PIPs used in the design is considered as a vulnerability. Further, the number of 3PIPs used is directly proportional to the number of operations in the DMR design. In the proposed approach we detect each such potential vulnerability by applying the concept of distinct vendor to both original and duplicate operations in DMR design. Thus, the extent of security is the capability of proposed approach to detect potential vulnerabilities. Fig. 9 shows the number of potential vulnerabilities detectable by proposed approach for each benchmark (comprising of a mix of DFGs, single loop CDFGs and nested loop CDFGs). As seen in Fig. 9 , the number of vulnerabilities is largest for DHMC nested loop CDFG, which are all detected by proposed approach.
VIII. CONCLUSION This paper presented a novel work on simultaneous exploration of an optimized Trojan secured schedule and optimal loop unrolling factor for CDFGs. More explicitly, this paper contributed in the following novel aspects. 1) A model for execution delay determination of a DMR system for Trojan secured CDFG. 2) Particle encoding scheme that concurrently explores schedule configuration, unrolling factor and vendor allocation procedure. 3) Methodology for area-execution delay tradeoff using PSO during optimization of secured schedule. Our future research directions includes nanoelectronic technology-based trusted HLS as the hardware eventually implemented using such a technology [10] . For example, we intend to work on architecture-level synthesis-based obfuscation technique, IP trust, process variation awareness, and fault tolerance.
